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Monetary Policy and Inﬂation Dynamics∗
John M. Roberts
Federal Reserve Board
Since the early 1980s, the U.S. economy has changed in
some important ways: inﬂation now rises considerably less
when unemployment is low, and the volatility of output and
inﬂation have fallen sharply. This paper examines whether
changes in monetary policy can account for these changes in
the economy. The results suggest that changes in monetary
policy can account for most or all of the change in the inﬂation-
unemployment relationship. In addition, changes in policy can
explain a large proportion of the reduction in the volatility of
the output gap.
JEL Codes: E31, E32, E52, E61.
1. Introduction
In this paper, I assess the extent to which shifts in monetary pol-
icy can account for an important change in the relationship between
unemployment and inﬂation in the United States: it appears that, in
a simple reduced-form Phillips curve relationship between changes
in inﬂation and the unemployment rate, the estimated coeﬃcient on
unemployment has been considerably smaller since the early 1980s
than it was earlier (Atkeson and Ohanian 2001; Staiger, Stock, and
Watson 2001). In addition, I look at the ability of monetary policy
to account for changes in the reduction in the volatility of output
∗I am grateful to Flint Brayton, David Lebow, Dave Stockton, and participants
at seminars at the Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve System’s macro-
economics research committee, the NBER Monetary Economics program, and
Harvard University for helpful discussions; to John Williams for providing his
linearized version of the FRB/US model; and to Sarah Alves for able research
assistance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do
not necessarily represent those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System or its staﬀ.
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and inﬂation that also dates from the early 1980s (McConnell and
Perez-Quiros 2000).
The notion that monetary policy should aﬀect inﬂation dynam-
ics is an old one, dating at least to Friedman’s dictum that inﬂation
is always a monetary phenomenon (1968). In his famous “Critique,”
Lucas (1975) showed how changes in monetary policy could, in prin-
ciple, aﬀect inﬂation dynamics. However, Lucas considered only very
stylized monetary policies. Here, I explore the eﬀects of more realistic
changes in policy on inﬂation dynamics.
I consider several ways in which U.S. monetary policy may
have changed. First, monetary policy may have become more reac-
tive to output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations around the early 1980s
(Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler 2000). In addition, monetary policy
may have become more predictable, implying smaller shocks to
a simple monetary-policy reaction function. Finally, Orphanides
et al. (2000) argue that policymaker estimates of potential out-
put may have become more accurate. Such improvements in esti-
mates of potential output would constitute a change in monetary
policy, as policy would be made on the basis of more accurate
information.
I consider the eﬀects of changes in policy on expectations
formation, holding ﬁxed the other behavioral relationships in the
economy. Although other relationships are unchanged, changes in
policy can nonetheless aﬀect the reduced-form relationship between
inﬂation and economic activity by reducing the signal content
of economic slack for future inﬂation. For example, if monetary
policy acts more aggressively to stabilize the economy, then any
given deviation in output from potential will contain less of a sig-
nal of future inﬂation. Similarly, a reduction in the persistence of
potential output mismeasurement would mean that an increase in
output resulting from a misestimate of potential output will not
portend as much inﬂation because it is not expected to last as
long.
I examine the predictions of these changes in policy for inﬂation
dynamics and the economy’s volatility using stochastic simulations
of two macroeconomic models. One is a simple model composed of
three equations—for inﬂation, the federal funds rate, and the output
gap. The other is the Federal Reserve’s large-scale FRB/US model.
An advantage of looking at both models is that they represent points
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near the extremes of the range of complexity among models currently
employed in policy analysis.1
Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988) have argued that changes in
monetary policy may lead to changes in the frequency of price adjust-
ment and, thus, changes in the parameters of the price-adjustment
processes taken as structural here. In particular, they argue that the
lower and more-stable inﬂation that has marked the post-1982 period
is likely to lead to less-frequent price adjustment. The Ball-Mankiw-
Romer conjecture could thus provide an alternative explanation for
the reduction in the slope of the reduced-form Phillips curve. In a
recent empirical study, however, Boivin and Giannoni (forthcoming)
examined the sources of changes in the eﬀects of monetary policy sur-
prises on the economy. They found that the main source of changes
in the eﬀects of policy shocks was changes in the parameters of the
policy reaction function rather than in the structural parameters of
the economy, providing empirical support for the modeling strategy
adopted here.
To summarize the results brieﬂy, changes in monetary policy
can account for most or all of the reduction in the slope of the
reduced-form Phillips curve. Changes in policy can also account
for a large portion of the reduction in the volatility of output gap,
where the output gap is the percent diﬀerence between actual out-
put and a measure of trend or potential output. However, as in
other recent work (Stock and Watson 2002; Ahmed, Levin, and
Wilson 2004), changes in policy account for a smaller proportion
of changes in output growth. The ability to explain the reduction
in inﬂation volatility is mixed: in the small-scale model, it is pos-
sible to explain all of the reduction in inﬂation volatility, whereas
in FRB/US, the changes in policy predict only a small reduction in
volatility. Finally, monetary policy’s ability to account for changes
in the economy is enhanced when changes in monetary policy are
broadened to include improvements in the measurement of potential
GDP.
1Rudebusch (2005) has also looked at the impact of changes in monetary pol-
icy on the slope of the Phillips curve. He also ﬁnds that changes in monetary
policy can have an economically important eﬀect on the estimated slope of the
Phillips curve. He notes, however, that such a shift may be diﬃcult to detect
econometrically.
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Table 1. The U.S. Economy’s Changing Volatility
(Standard Deviations, Percentage Points)
Unem- Output Output
GDP Core ployment Gap, Gap,
Growtha Inﬂationa Rate FRB/US CBO
1984:Q1–2002:Q4 2.22 1.18 1.09 2.08 1.54
1960:Q1–1983:Q4 4.32 2.56 1.77 3.57 3.17
1960:Q1–1979:Q4 3.98 2.42 1.36 2.71 2.61
aQuarterly percent change, annual rate.
2. The Changing Economy
2.1 Volatility of Output and Inﬂation
Table 1 presents standard deviations of the annualized rate of quar-
terly GDP growth, core inﬂation (as measured by the annualized
quarterly percent change in the price index for personal consumption
expenditures other than food and energy), the civilian unemploy-
ment rate, and two measures of the output gap. The table compares
standard deviations from two early periods—1960–79 and 1960–83—
with a more recent period, 1984–2002.
A number of observations suggest this choice of sample periods.
First, shortly after arriving as Federal Reserve Chairman in 1979,
Paul Volcker initiated a major shift in U.S. monetary policy and, as
noted in the introduction, the empirical evidence suggests that U.S.
monetary policy shifted at about that time, or shortly thereafter.
Second, as discussed in the next subsection, Atkeson and Ohanian
(2001) ﬁnd an important shift in the relationship between inﬂation
and real economy activity dating from this period. Finally, as oth-
ers have noted (McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000; Blanchard and
Simon 2001), the U.S. economy has been much less volatile since
1983: the standard deviation of GDP growth has fallen by almost
half, and that of core inﬂation by a bit more than half. As dis-
cussed in McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), the drop in GDP
growth volatility is statistically signiﬁcant. As shown in the table,
there has also been a drop in the volatility of the unemployment
rate, although it is somewhat less sharp and more dependent on the
sample period: relative to the 1960–79 period, the standard deviation
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of the unemployment rate has fallen by 20 percent, but relative to
the period ending in 1983, the decline is almost 40 percent.
The table also shows results for two measures of the output gap—
one from the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model and one from the
Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO).2 For the FRB/US gap meas-
ure, the 1984–2002 standard deviation is 23 percent less than in
the 1960–79 period and 42 percent less than in the 1960–83 period.
The declines in volatility are sharper for the CBO output gap, with a
decline in standard deviation of 41 percent since the 1960–79 period
and 51 percent since the 1960–83 period.
2.2 The Slope of the Reduced-Form Phillips Curve
Figure 1 plots the over-the-year change in the four-quarter core PCE
inﬂation rate against a four-quarter moving average of the unem-
ployment rate. The panel on the left shows the scatter plot over
the 1960–83 period; the panel on the right shows the scatter plot
over the 1984–2002 period. Each panel includes a regression line;
the slope coeﬃcients are shown in the ﬁrst column of table 2. The
regression run is:
(pt − pt−4) − (pt−4 − pt−8) = γ0 + γ1(Σi=0,3 URt−i)/4, (1)
where (pt − pt−4) indicates the four-quarter percent change in core
PCE prices and UR is the civilian unemployment rate. As can be
seen in the table, the slope coeﬃcient of this reduced-form Phillips
curve falls by nearly half between either of the earlier periods and
the post-1983 period. Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) have also noted
a sharp drop in the slope of a similar reduced-form relationship, as
have Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001, ﬁgure 1.1).
Columns 2 and 3 of table 2 show the change in the slope co-
eﬃcient in equation (1), using the FRB/US and CBO output gaps,
2The output gap is deﬁned as the percentage deviation of real GDP from
an estimate of potential GDP. The FRB/US estimate of potential GDP is
production-function based, where the inputs are the current capital stock and
estimates of structural multifactor productivity (MFP) and structural labor
input. Structural MFP is estimated using Kalman-ﬁlter methods. Structural labor
input also uses Kalman-ﬁlter estimates of trends for the workweek and labor
force participation as well as other sources. CBO’s estimate of potential GDP is
described in CBO (2001).
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Figure 1. Change over the Year in Four-Quarter Core
PCE Inﬂation vs. Unemployment
Table 2. Evidence of a Shift in the Slope of the
Reduced-Form Phillips Curve, Simple Model
(Equation 1)
Unemployment FRB/US CBO
Rate Output Gap Output Gap
1984:Q1–2002:Q4 –.201 .092 .159
(.056) (.032) (.038)
1960:Q1–1983:Q4 –.389 .154 .207
(.085) (.050) (.043)
1960:Q1–1979:Q4 –.378 .130 .180
(.155) (.095) (.080)
Note: Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are adjusted for serial
correlation of equation residuals using the Newey-West procedure.
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Table 3. Evidence of a Shift in the Slope of the
Reduced-Form Phillips Curve, More Complex Model
(Equation 2)
Unemployment FRB/US CBO
Rate Output Gap Output Gap
Slope Coeﬃcient (γ1)
1984:Q1–2002:Q4 −.098 (.069) .051 (.036) .091 (.048)
1961:Q1–1983:Q4 −.154 (.052) .066 (.026) .084 (.028)
1961:Q1–1979:Q4 −.157 (.075) .056 (.038) .076 (.038)
Coeﬃcient on First Inﬂation Lag (γ2)
1984:Q1–2002:Q4 .29 (.12) .29 (.12) .28 (.12)
1961:Q1–1983:Q4 1.02 (.10) 1.05 (.11) 1.02 (.10)
1961:Q1–1979:Q4 1.01 (.11) 1.04 (.12) 1.02 (.10)
respectively, in lieu of the unemployment rate. Results using the
output gap provide a useful robustness check. In addition, the sim-
ple three-equation model used below includes the output gap rather
than the unemployment rate. The reduction in the Phillips-curve
slope is smaller using the output gap: for the FRB/US output gap,
the reduction is between 30 percent and 40 percent, depending on
the reference period, whereas for the CBO output gap, the reduction
is only 12 percent to 23 percent. (As might be expected given typi-
cal Okun’s law relationships, the coeﬃcients on the output gap are
about half the size of the coeﬃcients in the corresponding equations
using the unemployment rate—and, of course, they have the opposite
sign.)
In table 3, I look at an alternative speciﬁcation of the reduced-
form Phillips curve, in which the quarterly change in inﬂation is
regressed on three lags of itself and the level of the unemployment
rate:
∆pt = γ0 + γ1URt + γ2∆pt−1 + γ3∆pt−2
+ γ4∆pt−3 + (1 − γ2 − γ3 − γ4)∆pt−4, (2)
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where ∆pt indicates the (annualized) one-quarter percent change
in the core PCE price index. As in equation (1), the coeﬃcients on
lagged inﬂation are constrained to sum to one. I discuss the evidence
for this restriction in section 2.3. For the unemployment rate, the
results are qualitatively similar to those in table 2, although the mag-
nitude of the reduction in the slope is a bit less, as the coeﬃcient
falls by 35 percent to 40 percent. In this regression, there is also a
notable drop-oﬀ in the statistical signiﬁcance of the slope coeﬃcient,
with the t-ratio falling to 1.4 in the post-1983 sample, from levels of
around 2 or 3 in the earlier samples.
For the estimates with the output gap in columns 2 and 3,
the slope coeﬃcients now change little between the early and late
samples—indeed, for the CBO output gap, the coeﬃcient even rises.
However, in equation (2), the slope coeﬃcient no longer summa-
rizes the eﬀect of unemployment on inﬂation, because the pattern
of the coeﬃcients on lagged inﬂation also matters. As can be seen
in the bottom three rows of the table, there was an important shift
in these coeﬃcients, with the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst lag dropping
from around 1 in the early samples to a bit less than 0.3 in the post-
1983 sample. This change means that, in the later sample, an initial
shock to unemployment will have a much smaller eﬀect on inﬂation
in the following quarter than was the case in the earlier period. If the
impact of unemployment on inﬂation is adjusted for this change in
lag pattern, then the estimates in table 3 suggest that there has been
a sharp reduction of the impact of the output gap on inﬂation, of
between 50 percent and 67 percent.3 Because the slope coeﬃcient in
the simple model of equation (1) provides a single summary statistic
for the change in the inﬂation dynamics, I will focus on changes in
this coeﬃcient in my work below.4
3In particular, I compute a “sacriﬁce ratio,” which is the loss in output or
unemployment required to obtain a permanent reduction of 1 percentage point
in inﬂation.
4The working-paper version (Roberts 2004) includes additional reduced-form
results with more control variables, including food and energy prices, productiv-
ity, and changes in the natural rate of unemployment. Estimates of the drop in
the sacriﬁce ratio vary from 15 percent to 70 percent. Nonetheless, the results
presented in tables 2 and 3 are representative of the range of estimates.
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2.3 Has U.S. Inﬂation Stabilized?
In the preceding subsection, it was assumed that the sum of coef-
ﬁcients on lagged inﬂation in the reduced-form Phillips curves
remained equal to one. Of course, it is possible to imagine that if
a central bank had managed to stabilize the inﬂation rate, inﬂation
would no longer have a unit root, and the sum of lagged coeﬃ-
cients in the reduced-form Phillips curve would no longer equal one.
Ball (2000) argues that, prior to World War I, inﬂation was roughly
stable in the United States, and the sum of lagged coeﬃcients in
reduced-form Phillips curves was less than one; Gordon (1980) makes
a similar point.
It is not yet clear if inﬂation stability is once again a reality
for the United States. Figure 2 plots the sum of lagged inﬂation
coeﬃcients from a rolling regression of U.S. core PCE inﬂation
on four lags of itself, using windows of ten, ﬁfteen, and twenty
years. With a twenty-year window, the sum of lagged coeﬃcients
remains near 0.9 at the end of the sample, about where it was
twenty years earlier. With a ﬁfteen-year window, the sum is more
variable, but here, too, it ends the sample at a high level. Using
a ten-year window, there is more evidence that the persistence
of inﬂation has fallen, as the sum of lagged coeﬃcients drops to
around 0.5.
The inﬂation data in the bottom panel helps explain these
results. Inﬂation has moved down over the post-1983 period: inﬂa-
tion as measured by core PCE prices averaged 4 percent from 1984 to
1987 but only 11/2 percent over the 1998–2002 period. In the most
recent ten-year period, inﬂation has moved in a relatively narrow
range, consistent with the small coeﬃcient sum estimated over this
period.
While the results with the ten-year window suggest that the
United States may have entered a period of inﬂation stability, the
evidence from the wider windows is less conclusive. Of course, a
longer time series generally provides more convincing evidence than
a shorter one. On net, the evidence would seem to suggest that
inﬂation has remained highly persistent in the United States over
the 1984–2002 period. I will return to the issue of inﬂation stability
in section 7.
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Figure 2. Has Inﬂation Stabilized?
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3. Changing Monetary Policy
3.1 Changes in the Reaction Function
One way to characterize the implementation of monetary policy is
with a “dynamic Taylor rule” of the form:
ﬀt = ρﬀt−1 + (1 − ρ){r∗ + (pt − pt−4) + α xgapt
+ β[(pt − pt−4) − π∗t ]} + t, (3)
where ﬀ is the federal funds rate, r∗ is the equilibrium real interest
rate, (pt − pt−4) is the four-quarter inﬂation rate, xgap is the GDP
gap, and π∗ is the target inﬂation rate. A number of studies have
found that such a rule characterizes monetary policy after 1983 quite
well. Among others, these studies include Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler
(CGG, 2000) and English, Nelson, and Sack (ENS, 2003).
While the dynamic Taylor rule appears to be a good character-
ization of policy over the past two decades, its performance prior
to 1980 is less impressive. For example, CGG ﬁnd, in a similar
model, very small estimates of the inﬂation parameter β—indeed,
their point estimates put β at less than zero over the 1960–79 period.
In this case, real interest rates will fail to rise when inﬂation is above
target, which, as CGG discuss, can lead to an unstable inﬂation rate.
CGG emphasize the increase in the value of β as indicating an
important shift in monetary policy in the early 1980s. They also
provide evidence that policy has become more responsive to out-
put ﬂuctuations, reporting a large increase in α. Taylor (1999) and
Stock and Watson (2002) also ﬁnd a large increase in the coeﬃcient
on output in a similar monetary policy rule.
Table 4 summarizes the assumptions about monetary policy coef-
ﬁcients used in the simulations below. One set of parameters—
labeled “aggressive”—is similar to the estimates of ENS for recent
U.S. monetary policy. In the less-aggressive policy settings, the
response to output is assumed to be half that in the aggressive set-
ting, while the response to inﬂation is intended to be a minimal
response that is consistent with stability.5
5The “least” aggressive policy in column 1 is the base case; the “less” aggres-
sive alternative in column 2 is used in cases where the policy in column 1 leads
to numerical solution problems.
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Table 4. Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
Least Aggressive Less-Aggressive Aggressive
Policy Policy Policy
ρ 0.7 0.7 0.7
α 0.5 0.5 1.0
β 0.0001 0.1 0.5
The reaction function in equation (3) includes an error term.
One interpretation of such “shocks to monetary policy” is that they
constitute changes to the objectives of monetary policy that are
not fully captured by a simple econometric speciﬁcation. Such an
interpretation is perhaps most straightforward in a setting in which
the long-run inﬂation objective of the central bank is not ﬁrmly
established, as may have been the case for the United States in
the pre-1980 period. In such a context, shocks to the reaction func-
tion could correspond to changes in the inﬂation target. Another
interpretation—that the shocks represent errors in the estimation of
the right-hand-side variables of the model—will be taken up shortly.
Table 5 presents some evidence that the variability of the error
term in the reaction function has fallen. The ﬁrst column presents
the unconditional standard deviation of the change in the quarterly
average funds rate, which falls by between 40 percent and 55 percent,
depending on the early reference period. The second column reports
the standard error of the residuals from simple reduced-form models
of the funds rate, in which the funds rate is regressed on four lags
Table 5. Volatility of the Federal Funds Rate
(Standard Deviations, Percentage Points)
Residuals
Change in from Reduced-
Funds Rate Form Model
1984:Q1–2002:Q4 .56 .38
1960:Q1–1983:Q4 1.27 1.16
1960:Q1–1979:Q4 .92 .70
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of itself, the current value and four lags of the FRB/US output
gap, and the current value and four lags of quarterly core PCE
inﬂation. This residual is considerably less variable in the post-1983
period, with the standard deviation falling by between 45 percent
and 67 percent. In the simulations in sections 5 and 6, I will consider
a reduction in the standard deviation of the shock to a monetary-
policy reaction function like equation (3) of a bit more than half,
from 1.0 to 0.47.
3.2 Improvements in Output Gap Estimation
As noted in the introduction, Orphanides et al. (2000) have sug-
gested a speciﬁc interpretation for the error term—namely, that it
reﬂects measurement error in the output gap. In particular, suppose
that the monetary authorities operate under the reaction function:
ﬀt = ρﬀt−1 + (1 − ρ){r∗ + (pt − pt−4)
+ α(xgapt + noiset) + β[(pt − pt−4) − π∗t ]}, (4)
where,
noiset = φ noiset−1 + t. (5)
Here, noise has the interpretation of measurement error in the out-
put gap. Orphanides et al. (2000) estimate the time-series process
for ex post errors in the output gap by comparing real-time esti-
mates of the output gap with the best available estimates at the
end of their sample. They ﬁnd that there was an important shift in
the time-series properties of the measurement error in the output
gap. In particular, for the period 1980–94, the serial correlation of
output gap mismeasurement is 0.84, considerably smaller than the
0.96 serial correlation they ﬁnd when they extend their sample back
to 1966.6
6It is reasonable to suppose that recent revisions to potential output will be
smaller than revisions in the more-distant past, owing simply to the passage of
time: estimates in the middle of the sample will be more accurate because future
data as well as past data can be used to inform the estimate. To get some notion
of the potential importance of this eﬀect, I ran a Monte Carlo experiment on a
Kalman-ﬁlter model of trend output. I found that the reduction in revisions at
the end of the sample was much smaller than what Orphanides et al. (2000) doc-
ument. Hence, the reduction in revisions in Orphanides et al. appears too large
to be explained by the simple passage of time.
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The later period examined by Orphanides et al.—1980–1994—is
earlier than the post-1983 period that has been characterized by
reduced volatility and reduced responsiveness of inﬂation to the
unemployment rate. It would thus be of interest to have an esti-
mate of such errors for a more-recent period. The paper by English,
Nelson, and Sack (2003) suggests an indirect method of obtaining
such an estimate. They estimate a monetary-policy reaction func-
tion similar to equation (3), but with a serially correlated error term.
When estimated using current-vintage data, such a model can be
given an interpretation in terms of the reaction function with noisy
output gap measurement in equations (4) and (5). This can be seen
by rewriting equation (4) as
ﬀt = ρﬀt−1 + (1 − ρ){r∗ + (pt − pt−4)
+ α xgapt + β[(pt − pt−4) − π∗t ]} + ut, (6)
where ut ≡ α(1 − ρ) noiset, and is thus an AR(1) error process
because, as noted in equation (5), noiset is an AR(1) process.
The results of ENS suggest that the noise process had a root
of 0.7 over the 1987–2001 period. Estimates of a model similar to
theirs suggest that the standard deviation of the shock to the noise
process was 1.2 percentage points—about the same as Orphanides
et al. (2000) found for both their overall and post-1979 samples.7
The preceding discussion suggests two extreme noise processes—
the “worst-case” process identiﬁed by Orphanides et al. (2000), with
a serial correlation parameter of 0.96, and the process implicit in the
serial correlation process of the error term from a reaction function
estimated with recent data, where φ = 0.70. I will also consider an
intermediate case, with φ = 0.92, which can be thought of as a less-
extreme version of the Orphanides et al. worst case. Because there
is little evidence for a shift in the standard deviation of the shock
to the noise process, I assume the same value for all three processes,
1.10. These assumptions are summarized in table 6.
7The standard errors of the shocks to the estimated processes were similar
in the two samples of Orphanides et al.: 1.09 and 0.97 percentage points in the
longer and shorter samples, respectively.
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Table 6. Alternative Assumptions about Gap Estimation
Errors (Standard Deviations, Percentage Points)
Serial Impact Unconditional
Correlation Standard Standard
φ Deviation Deviation
Worst Case .96 1.1 3.9
Intermediate .92 1.1 2.8
Recent Past .70 1.1 1.5
3.3 Speciﬁcation of the Inﬂation Target
As discussed in section 2.3, movements in inﬂation appear to have
remained persistent in the 1983–2002 period. One reason for such
persistence may be that the implicit inﬂation objective varied over
this period. A speciﬁcation that allows for inﬂation objectives to
drift in response to actual events is
π∗t = µπ
∗
t−1 + (1 − µ)∆pt, (7)
where, as before, ∆pt represents annualized inﬂation. In equa-
tion (7), a ﬁxed inﬂation target can be speciﬁed by setting µ = 1.
If µ < 1, however, then the inﬂation target will be aﬀected by past
inﬂation experience, and inﬂation will possess a unit root. In most of
the simulations that follow, I assume µ = 0.9. In simulations of the
FRB/US model, this value of µ allows the model to capture the his-
torical relationship between economic slack and persistent changes
in inﬂation. The results are not greatly aﬀected by small changes in
this parameter.
4. Models
I examine the implications of changes in the conduct of monetary
policy for output and inﬂation variability using two models. One is
a variant of the three-equation macroeconomic model that has been
used in many recent analyses of monetary policy (see, for exam-
ple, Fuhrer and Moore 1995; Rotemberg and Woodford 1997; Levin,
Wieland, and Williams 1999; and Rudebusch 2005). One appeal of
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the three-equation model is that it can be thought of as including
the minimal number of variables needed to model the monetary pol-
icy process: the monetary-policy reaction function is combined with
equations for its independent variables—inﬂation and the output
gap. In addition, the model’s small size makes it straightforward to
vary model parameters. The model is described more fully shortly.
The other model I use is the Federal Reserve’s large-scale
FRB/US model. FRB/US is described in detail in Brayton et al.
(1997) and Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams (1999). Among the
key features of the FRB/US model are the following: the underly-
ing structure is optimization based, decisions of agents depend on
explicit expectations of future variables, and the structural parame-
ters of the model are estimated. More-speciﬁc features of the model
are discussed at the end of this section.
In both the three-equation model and FRB/US, economic agents
are assumed to be at least somewhat forward looking, and they form
model-consistent expectations of future outcomes. As a consequence,
their expectations will be functions of the monetary policy rule in
the model. In this way, these models are—at least to some extent—
robust to the Lucas critique, which argues that agents’ expectations
should change when the policy environment changes.
In addition to the monetary-policy reaction function described in
section 3, the three-equation model also includes a New Keynesian
Phillips curve and a simple “IS curve” that relates the current out-
put gap to its lagged level and to the real short-term interest rate.
The New Keynesian Phillips curve is
∆pt = Et∆pt+1 + κ xgapt + ηt, (8)
where ηt is an error term representing shocks to inﬂation. The
microeconomic underpinnings of such a model are discussed in vari-
ous places—see, for example, Roberts (1995). Because equation (8)
can be thought of as having an explicit structural interpretation, it
will be referred to as the “structural Phillips curve,” in contrast to
“reduced-form Phillips curves” such as equations (1) and (2).
One shortcoming of the New Keynesian Phillips curve under
rational expectations is that it does a poor job of ﬁtting some key
macroeconomic facts (Fuhrer and Moore 1995). A number of sug-
gestions have been made for addressing its empirical shortcomings.
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Some recent work has focused on the possibility that inﬂation
expectations are less than perfectly rational (Mankiw and Reis
2002). One way of specifying inﬂation expectations that are less
than perfectly rational is
Et∆pt+1 = ωMt∆pt+1 + (1 − ω)∆pt−1, (9)
where the operator M indicates rational or “mathematical” expec-
tations. An interpretation of this speciﬁcation is that only a frac-
tion ω of agents use rational expectations, while the remainder use
last period’s inﬂation rate as a simple rule of thumb for forecasting
inﬂation. Substituting equation (9) into equation (8) yields
∆pt = ωMt∆pt+1 + (1 − ω)∆pt−1 + κ xgapt + ηt. (10)
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(CEE, 2005) provide alternative microeconomic interpretations of
equation (10). Fuhrer and Moore assume that agents are concerned
with relative real wages. CEE argue that in some periods, agents
fully reoptimize their inﬂation expectations, whereas in others, they
simply move their wage or price along with last period’s aggregate
wage or price inﬂation. In their model, wages and prices are reset
each period and thus are only sticky for a very brief period. The only
question is how much information is used in changing those wages
and prices.
The theoretical models of both Fuhrer and Moore and CEE sug-
gest that ω = 1/2. The results of Boivin and Giannoni (forthcoming)
provide empirical support for ω = 1/2. I will therefore assume ω is
about 1/2 in the simulations below.8 I discuss other aspects of the
calibration choice in section 6.
The IS curve is
xgapt = θ1xgapt−1 + (1 − θ1)Et xgapt+1 − θ2(rt−2 − r∗) + νt, (11)
8To be precise, I assume ω = 0.475. I choose a value slightly less than 1/2
because with larger values, the model with an evolving inﬂation target often
proved unstable—technically, it had too many large roots—when expectations
formation was strongly forward looking. This result suggests that with an evolv-
ing inﬂation target, stability is aﬀected by the degree of forward-looking behavior.
Technical issues aside, this result suggests an alternative reason why the econ-
omy may be highly volatile when there is not a ﬁrm commitment to an inﬂation
target.
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where r is the real federal funds rate and νt is a random shock
to aggregate demand. As in equations (3) and (4), r∗ is the equi-
librium real federal funds rate, which is assumed to be constant.
One way to interpret the equation’s error term, νt, however, is as
a variation in r∗. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) discuss how an
IS curve with θ1 = 0 can be derived from household optimizing
behavior. Amato and Laubach (2004) show how habit persistence
can lead to a speciﬁcation with lagged as well as future output.
These papers also show how the equilibrium real interest rate,
r∗, is related to the underlying preference parameters of house-
holds. The lagged eﬀect of interest rates on output can be jus-
tiﬁed by planning lags; Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) assume
a similar lag. Again, details of the calibration are provided in
section 6.
Stock and Watson (2002) also examine the eﬀects of changes in
monetary policy using a small macroeconomic model. Their model
also has a reduced-form output equation, a model of inﬂation with
explicitly forward-looking elements, and a monetary-policy reaction
function; in addition, they include an equation for commodity prices.
While Stock and Watson’s model includes several explicitly cali-
brated parameters, it also includes a number of lag variables for
which parameters are not reported, making a close comparison of
the models diﬃcult.
The three-equation model is limited in the detail it can pro-
vide. For example, it is speciﬁed in terms of the output gap rather
than overall output. Thus, for this model, only the variability of the
output gap, and not output growth as well, can be reported. The
more-elaborate FRB/US model includes estimates of output growth
as well as output gap, which will facilitate comparisons with ear-
lier work that only reports results for output growth. Also, in the
three-equation model, inﬂation is a function directly of the output
gap, whereas in most structural models, prices should be related
to marginal cost. As discussed in Brayton et al. (1997), however,
in the FRB/US model, inﬂation is modeled as ultimately moving
with marginal cost, subject to adjustment costs. Finally, the three-
equation model cannot show the implications of a shock to trend
productivity; the only supply shock in the model is the shock to the
Phillips curve. In the current version of the FRB/US model, multi-
factor productivity is explicitly modeled as a stochastic trend. Hence,
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the stochastic simulations of the FRB/US model include technology
shocks.9
5. Impulse Responses
This section examines how the output and inﬂation eﬀects of shocks
to the model economy change under diﬀerent monetary policies.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀects of a shock to the IS curve on output
and inﬂation using the three-equation model discussed in the previ-
ous section. The top panel shows the eﬀects of the shock under the
least aggressive monetary policy, while the bottom panel shows the
eﬀects under the aggressive policy. In both panels, the shock initially
raises output and inﬂation. Because the inﬂation target is aﬀected
by past inﬂation, there is a permanent increase in inﬂation in both
panels. However, under the aggressive policy in the bottom panel,
output returns more rapidly to its preshock value, and the long-run
increase in inﬂation is much smaller. Moreover, one to two years after
the initial shock, the increase in inﬂation is notably smaller relative
to output, suggesting a smaller reduced-form relationship between
these variables under the aggressive policy.
Figure 4 looks at the eﬀects of a reduction in the persistence
of output gap estimation errors, holding ﬁxed the responsiveness of
monetary policy at the aggressive level. The top panel considers the
worst-case estimate for error persistence (φ = 0.96), while the bot-
tom panel shows the recent-past case (φ = 0.7). As can be seen,
an initial 1-percentage-point estimation error has much-larger and
more-persistent eﬀects on output and inﬂation in the top panel than
in the bottom panel. Moreover, the impact of the shock on inﬂation
over the ﬁrst couple of years is much larger relative to the impact
on inﬂation in the top panel, again suggesting a larger reduced-form
slope.10
9Footnote 2 contains additional information about the supply side of the
FRB/US model.
10Some notion of how the relationship between output and inﬂation changes
between the top and bottom panels of ﬁgures 3 and 4 can be gleaned from changes
in the sacriﬁce ratio, which can be thought of as the integral of the output gap
divided by the permanent change in inﬂation. In ﬁgure 3, the sacriﬁce ratio is 4.6
for the simulation in the top panel and 7.7 in the bottom panel. Hence, under
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Figure 3. Implications of a More-Aggressive
Monetary Policy for the Eﬀects of an IS Shock
Three-Equation Model
the aggressive policy in the bottom panel, any given change in inﬂation is associ-
ated with a larger output gap, consistent with the expectation that an aggressive
policy will limit the inﬂation consequences of any given movement in the output
gap. In ﬁgure 4, the sacriﬁce ratio is 3.1 in the top panel and 4.7 in the bot-
tom panel, again consistent with the idea that better monetary policy limits the
responsiveness of inﬂation to output gaps.
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Figure 4. Eﬀects of an Output Gap Estimation Error
Three-Equation Model
Figure 5 shows the eﬀects of a shock to the Phillips curve itself.
The two panels once again show the eﬀects of the shock under
alternative assumptions about how aggressively monetary policy
reacts. Looking ﬁrst at the top panel, the shock leads to an immedi-
ate increase in inﬂation and, because the inﬂation target is assumed
to be aﬀected by past inﬂation in this simulation, inﬂation remains
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Figure 5. Implications of a More-Aggressive Monetary
Policy for the Eﬀects of a Supply Shock
Three-Equation Model
permanently higher. The output gap rises in this case, as the weak—
and gradual—response of monetary policy to the higher inﬂation
leads initially to a decline in the real interest rate and thus stimu-
lates aggregate demand. As a result, inﬂation rises a bit more than
in response to the initial shock. Under the aggressive policy in the
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bottom panel, however, real interest rates eventually rise relative to
baseline, so there is a period of negative output gaps. The eventual
increase in inﬂation is thus smaller than under the least aggressive
policy, although, once again, because the inﬂation target is allowed
to be endogenous, inﬂation is permanently higher.
Of course, the simulations in ﬁgures 3 through 5 show only the
eﬀects of individual shocks. By contrast, the empirical reduced-form
Phillips-curve coeﬃcients such as those discussed in section 2 reﬂect
the eﬀects of all shocks. A convenient way to consider the joint eﬀect
of a number of shocks on the reduced-form coeﬃcients is stochastic
simulation, the subject of the next section.
6. Stochastic Simulations
6.1 Results with the Three-Equation Model
In this subsection, I use the three-equation model to assess how
changes in monetary policy aﬀect volatility and the relationship
between inﬂation and unemployment.
To calibrate the IS curve of the model, I ﬁrst chose a weight
on future output, θ1, of 1/2, similar to the degree of forward look-
ing assumed in the structural Phillips curve discussed above. I then
chose the IS-curve slope, θ2, so as to match the eﬀect of an iden-
tiﬁed monetary policy shock on output in a VAR estimated over
the 1960–2002 period, which implied θ2 = 0.1. I chose the slope of
the structural Phillips curve and the standard errors of the shocks
to the IS and structural Phillips curves so as to approximate the
volatility of output, the volatility of inﬂation, and the slope of the
simple reduced-form Phillips curve. This exercise resulted in stan-
dard deviations of the IS and Phillips-curve shocks of 0.55 percent-
age point and 0.17 percentage point, respectively, and a structural
Phillips-curve slope of 0.005. Note that the model has been cal-
ibrated so that the volatility of the residuals is representative of
the low-volatility period for the U.S. economy. The IS and Phillips-
curve parameter estimates are in broad agreement with empirical
estimates of New Keynesian models, such as Boivin and Giannoni
(forthcoming).
To carry out the stochastic simulations, I ﬁrst solve the model
under model-consistent expectations. I then use this solution to
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generate simulated data by taking random draws from the distri-
bution of the model residuals. For each draw, a time series of 160
quarters is created. To reduce the inﬂuence of starting values, the
ﬁrst eighty quarters are discarded, and sample statistics are com-
puted using the last eighty quarters. The shocks are drawn from a
normal distribution.
The standard deviation of output growth, the output gap, and
inﬂation are calculated for each draw, and the summary statistics
are averaged over the draws. Similarly, the slope of the reduced-form
Phillips curve is estimated for each draw. I present the slope coef-
ﬁcients from two models. One is the simple reduced-form Phillips
curve of equation (1), modiﬁed to use the output gap rather than
the unemployment rate:
(pt − pt−4) − (pt−4 − pt−8) = γ0 + γ1 (Σi=0,3 xgapt−i)/4. (12)
Presenting results for this simple model has the advantage that the
results are directly comparable to the simple relations illustrated in
ﬁgure 1; also, the results focus attention (and econometric power)
on the slope coeﬃcient. I also consider the slightly more elaborate
reduced-form Phillips curve:
∆pt = γ0 + γ1 xgapt + γ2∆pt−1
+ γ3∆pt−2 + γ4∆pt−3 + γ5∆pt−4. (13)
Equation (13) is similar to equation (2) except that, here, the sum
of the lagged inﬂation coeﬃcients is not constrained to sum to one.
Estimates of this equation can thus allow for the possibility that the
changes in policy under consideration may have reduced the sum of
lag coeﬃcients.11
In table 7, I consider the eﬀects of changes in the coeﬃcients of
the reaction function and changes in the volatility of a simple i.i.d.
error term added to the reaction function. These changes in policy
are similar to those that Stock and Watson (2002) have considered.
I later turn to the possibility that the serial correlation of errors
in the measurement of the output gap may have fallen. Initially, to
11The reported coeﬃcient standard errors for equation (12) are based on the
simulated distributions and so are not aﬀected by the serial correlation induced
by the overlapping left-hand-side variable.
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Table 7. The Eﬀects of Changes in Monetary Policy on
Volatility and the Slope of the Reduced-Form
Phillips Curve: Three-Equation Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inﬂation Target: Evolving Evolving Evolving Fixed
M-policy Shock: S.D. = 1.0 S.D. = 1.0 S.D. = 0.47 S.D. = 0.47
α and β: 0.5 and 0.0001 1.0 and 0.5 1.0 and 0.5 1.0 and 0.5
Volatility :
S.D. (Gap) 2.32 1.82 1.79 1.84
S.D. (Inﬂation) 2.36 1.20 1.19 1.02
Phillips Curves:
Simple; Slope .213 .139 .139 .146
(.073) (.084) (.086) (.085)
With Lags; Slope .062 .041 .041 .040
(.024) (.026) (.026) (.026)
Sum Lag Coefs. .98 .94 .94 .93
(.03) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Inﬂation, .97 .94 .94 .92
Largest Root (.03) (.05) (.05) (.05)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
“Sum lag coefs.” indicates the sum of the coeﬃcients on lagged
inﬂation.
Based on stochastic simulations with 5,000 draws.
isolate the eﬀects of these changes in policy from the possibility that
target inﬂation has become better anchored, I assume that target
inﬂation is updated using equation (7) with a parameter µ = 0.9.
Comparing columns 1 and 2 shows the eﬀects of moving to
a more-aggressive monetary policy. This policy shift leads to an
important reduction in the volatility of both the output gap and
inﬂation: the standard deviation of the gap falls by about one-
quarter, while the standard deviation of inﬂation falls by half. The
reduction in the volatility of the output gap is at the low end of
the range of the historical decline between early and later periods,
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while the reduction in inﬂation volatility is in line with that seen
historically.12
The slope of the simple reduced-form Phillips curve falls by about
one-third, in line with historical reductions in the Phillips-curve
slope as measured with the output gap, although somewhat short
of the reductions in the coeﬃcient on the unemployment rate. Also,
the t-statistic on the slope of the simple Phillips curve falls from
2.9 to 1.6, suggesting that these changes in monetary policy may
also have aﬀected the apparent statistical robustness of the simple
Phillips-curve relationship. The more-elaborate Phillips curve shows
a similar reduction in slope, while the sum of coeﬃcients on lagged
inﬂation remains high.13
Column 3 introduces an additional change in monetary policy, a
reduction in the volatility of the shock to policy. In this model, this
additional change has very little eﬀect on the results: the volatility of
the output gap and inﬂation fall somewhat more, but the estimated
Phillips-curve slopes are very similar to those in column 2.
Column 4 looks at the implications of the switch to a ﬁxed inﬂa-
tion target, under the assumption of an aggressive monetary policy
and small shocks to the reaction function, as in column 3. This shift
in policy has only small eﬀects on the results: the volatility of the
output gap actually rises a bit, while that of inﬂation falls by about
15 percent. The slope of the reduced-form Phillips curve rises a bit.
Perhaps surprisingly, the persistence of inﬂation falls only slightly,
and inﬂation remains highly persistent. In section 7, I return to the
question of how the behavior of the economy might change if the
central bank were to adopt a strict inﬂation target.
12It is worth noting that this improvement in both output and inﬂation volatil-
ity is not at variance with Taylor’s (1979) well-known volatility trade-oﬀ. Taylor’s
trade-oﬀ described the choice among alternative optimal policies, whereas the
policy changes I am examining here represent a shift from policies that are well
outside the optimality frontier toward policies that are closer to that frontier.
13The change in policy between columns 1 and 2 of table 7 involves an increase
in the reaction-function coeﬃcients on both the output gap and inﬂation. If only
the coeﬃcient on inﬂation is increased, there is a sharp reduction in inﬂation
volatility (to a standard deviation of 1.5 percent) but a proportionately smaller
reduction in output gap volatility (to a standard deviation of 2.1 percent). The
slope of the simple reduced-form Phillips curve falls to 0.173, near the midpoint
of the estimates shown in columns 1 and 2, suggesting that both elements of the
more-aggressive policy contribute to the reduction in the Phillips-curve slope.
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Table 8. The Eﬀects of Changes in the Persistence
of Potential Output Errors on Volatility and the
Slope of the Reduced-Form Phillips Curve:
Three-Equation Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error Persistence: 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.7 0.7
Inﬂation Target: Evolving Fixed Evolving Evolving Fixed
α and β: 0.5 & 0.1 1.0 & 0.5 0.5 & 0.1 1.0 & 0.5 1.0 & 0.5
Volatility:
S.D. (Gap) 3.51 2.64 2.68 1.82 1.88
S.D. (Inﬂation) 6.71 2.37 3.31 1.22 1.05
Phillips Curves:
Simple; Slope .289 .221 .239 .145 .150
(.066) (.068) (.070) (.085) (.082)
With Lags: Slope .069 .059 .064 .043 .043
(.024) (.022) (.023) (.026) (.026)
Sum Lag Coefs. .99 .97 .98 .94 .93
(.02) (.03) (.03) (.06) (.06)
Inﬂation, .99 .97 .98 .94 .93
Largest Root (.02) (.03) (.03) (.05) (.05)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
“Sum lag coefs.” indicates the sum of the coeﬃcients on lagged
inﬂation.
Based on stochastic simulations with 5,000 draws.
Table 8 considers the model with persistent gap errors, along
the lines suggested by Orphanides et al. (2000). Column 1 shows
Orphanides et al.’s “worst-case scenario,” in which output-gap esti-
mation errors have a quarterly autocorrelation of 0.96. In column 1,
a weak response of monetary policy to output and inﬂation errors
is assumed. In this case, the volatility of the output gap is at the
high end of historical estimates, while the volatility of inﬂation is far
greater than was the case historically. In columns 2 and 3, I there-
fore consider two ways of reducing the inﬂuence of persistent out-
put gap errors. In column 2, I assume the more-aggressive policy
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reaction-function parameters along with a ﬁxed inﬂation target.14
With this policy, the volatility of the output gap is about in line
with historical values for the 1960–79 period, and inﬂation is much
closer to the historical range. The slope of the simple reduced-form
Phillips curve is just above the historical range. Inﬂation is highly
persistent, with a root of 0.97. These results are consistent with the
argument made in Orphanides (2001) that poor estimation of poten-
tial output, rather than weak response of monetary policy to output
and inﬂation, was responsible for volatile and persistent inﬂation in
the pre-1984 period.
In column 3, I consider an alternative in which the monetary
policy reaction remains weak, but output gap errors are somewhat
less persistent than in columns 1 and 2. This adjustment cuts the
standard deviation of inﬂation by more than half, bringing it closer
to the range that was seen historically. Both columns 2 and 3 provide
plausible candidate characterizations of the high-volatility period.
Column 4 considers the implications of a reduction in the persis-
tence of the shock to the reaction function, so that φ = 0.7, under the
assumption of an aggressive monetary policy. As can be seen by com-
paring column 4 with column 2, reducing the persistence of the shock
to the reaction function while holding the parameters of the reac-
tion function ﬁxed has important eﬀects on the volatility of output
and the slope of the Phillips curve. The standard deviation of the
output gap falls by 30 percent, and the volatility of inﬂation falls
by almost half. The slope of the simple Phillips curve falls by about
one-third. As in table 7, there is a marked reduction in the statisti-
cal signiﬁcance of the Phillips-curve slope, as the t-ratio falls from
more than 3 to just 1.7. Inﬂation remains highly persistent, with an
autoregressive root of 0.94.
Comparing column 4 with column 3 gives an alternative view of
the change in monetary policy—namely, that it represented a com-
bination of more-aggressive policy and better estimation of poten-
tial output. The story on output volatility is about the same as for
column 2. The reduction in the slope of the simple reduced-form
Phillips curve is greater in this case, at around one-half.
14A ﬁxed inﬂation target is assumed because of numerical problems with the
solution under an evolving target. Inﬂation is nonetheless highly persistent in this
case.
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The ﬁnal column of table 8 adds the assumption of a ﬁxed inﬂa-
tion target. The volatility of inﬂation falls somewhat further, while
that of the output gap rises a bit. Estimates of the slope of the
Phillips curve are little changed. As in table 7, the adoption of a
ﬁxed inﬂation target has surprisingly little eﬀect on the persistence
of inﬂation in this model.
6.2 Results with FRB/US
In this section, I work with the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model of
the U.S. economy. In the simulations, I solve a linearized version of
the FRB/US model under model-consistent expectations. The draws
for the stochastic simulations are taken from a multivariate normal
distribution using the variance-covariance matrix of residuals from
the FRB/US model estimated over the 1983–2001 period. Hence,
the volatility of the residuals is representative of the low-volatility
period for the U.S. economy. Because the FRB/US model includes
the unemployment rate, these reduced-form Phillips-curve results
are based on this variable, as in equations (1) and (2).
Columns 1, 2, and 3 of table 9 consider the eﬀects of ﬁrst increas-
ing the parameters of the reaction function and then reducing the
volatility of the (not serially correlated) shock to the reaction func-
tion. As in table 7, it is primarily the change in the reaction-function
parameters that aﬀects the volatility of output; there is only a
small further reduction from reducing the volatility of the reaction-
function shock. Between column 1 and column 3, the standard devi-
ation of the GDP gap falls by about 30 percent, somewhat more
than with the three-equation model. However, the standard devia-
tion of GDP growth falls by only about 10 percent. The reduction
in the volatility of the output gap is in the range of the historical
decline between the 1960–79 and 1983–2002 periods. But the reduc-
tion in GDP growth volatility is considerably smaller than what
actually occurred, a ﬁnding similar to that of Stock and Watson
(2002).
Increasing the reaction-function parameters leads to a reduction
of only about 10 percent in the slope of the simple reduced-form
Phillips curve; the slope of the more-elaborate Phillips curve, how-
ever, falls by more than 40 percent. Inﬂation is highly persistent
in both columns 1 and 2, with an autoregressive root around 0.9.
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Table 9. The Eﬀects of Changes in Monetary Policy on
Volatility and the Slope of the Reduced-Form
Phillips Curve: FRB/US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inﬂation Target: Evolving Evolving Evolving Fixed
M-policy Shock: S.D. = 1.0 S.D. = 1.0 S.D. = .47 S.D. = .47
α and β: 0.5 and 0.0001 1.0 and 0.5 1.0 and 0.5 1.0 and 0.5
Volatility :
S.D. (Gap) 2.4 1.8 1.7 1.9
S.D. (GDP Growth) 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.1
S.D. (Inﬂation) 2.8 3.2 3.2 1.6
Phillips Curves:
Simple; Slope −.186 −.176 −.129 −.081
(.279) (.394) (.409) (.278)
With Lags; Slope −.130 −.074 −.054 −.081
(.179) (.198) (.205) (.181)
Sum Lag Coefs. .84 .89 .89 .71
(.12) (.10) (.10) (.20)
Inﬂation, .89 .92 .92 .77
Largest Root (.07) (.07) (.07) (.11)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
“Sum lag coefs.” indicates the sum of the coeﬃcients on lagged
inﬂation.
Based on stochastic simulations with 2,000 draws.
With the reduction in the volatility of the monetary policy shock in
column 3, the slope of the simple Phillips curve relative to column 1
is now about one-third smaller. The slope of the more-elaborate
Phillips curve also declines further, and the total reduction is now
almost 60 percent. As in the three-equation model, these changes in
monetary policy can account for most or all of the reduction in the
slope of the reduced-form Phillips curve.
Column 4 looks at the implications of the switch to a ﬁxed inﬂa-
tion target, under the assumption of an aggressive monetary policy
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Table 10. The Eﬀects of Changes in the Persistence
of Potential Output Errors on Volatility and
the Slope of the Reduced-Form Phillips Curve:
FRB/US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Error Persistence: 0.96 0.96 0.90 0.70 0.70
Inﬂation Target: Evolving Fixed Evolving Evolving Fixed
α and β: 0.5 & 0.1 1.0 & 0.5 0.5 & 0.1 1.0 & 0.5 1.0 & 0.5
Volatility :
S.D. (Gap) 6.1 3.4 3.5 1.8 1.9
S.D. (GDP Growth) 5.8 4.0 4.1 3.2 3.1
S.D. (Inﬂation) 6.3 3.6 3.7 3.3 1.7
Phillips Curves:
Simple; Slope −.47 −.50 −.33 −.17 −.102
(.16) (.20) (.22) (.41) (.26)
With Lags; Slope −.37 −.35 −.22 −.070 −.093
(.18) (.16) (.17) (.21) (.18)
Sum Lag Coefs. .83 .84 .84 .89 .71
(.09) (.09) (.11) (.11) (.20)
Inﬂation, .94 .92 .92 .92 .77
Largest Root (.04) (.06) (.05) (.07) (.11)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
“Sum lag coefs.” indicates the sum of the coeﬃcients on lagged
inﬂation.
Based on stochastic simulations with 2,000 draws.
and small shocks to the reaction function, as in column 3. In con-
trast to the three-equation model, there is now a large reduction
in inﬂation persistence with the switch to a ﬁxed inﬂation target, a
result perhaps more in line with prior expectations.
Table 10 considers the implications of reduced serial correlation
in output-gap estimation errors as well as changes in the respon-
siveness of policy. Assuming the “worst-case” output-gap estimation
errors along with a weak response of monetary policy to output and
224 International Journal of Central Banking September 2006
inﬂation (column 1) leads to volatilities of output and inﬂation that
are far greater than was the case historically. For inﬂation, this result
is similar to that in table 8; for the output gap, the excess volatility
is much greater. Columns 2 and 3 repeat the two solutions to this
excess volatility used with the three-equation model: (i) assuming
a more-aggressive policy and (ii) assuming somewhat smaller per-
sistence of estimation errors. Both solutions reduce the volatility of
output and inﬂation, and both lead to plausible characterizations of
the earlier period.
Column 4 considers the implications of a reduction in the persis-
tence of the shock to the reaction function, so that φ = 0.7, under
the assumption of an aggressive monetary policy. As can be seen
by comparing column 4 with column 2, reducing the persistence of
the shock to the reaction function while holding the parameters of
the reaction function ﬁxed has large eﬀects on the volatility of the
output gap and the slope of the Phillips curve. The standard devi-
ation of the output gap falls by almost half, at the high end of the
range of the historical decline. However, the reduction in the stan-
dard deviation of output growth is only about 20 percent. The slope
of the simple Phillips curve falls by two-thirds—even more than the
declines that have been seen historically. Inﬂation remains highly
persistent, with an autoregressive root of 0.92. The comparison of
column 4 with column 3 yields similar results for output volatility.
The reduction in the slope of the simple reduced-form Phillips curve
is less sharp in this case, but it is still around 40 percent.
While the FRB/US model predicts reductions in output gap
volatility and the slope of the Phillips curve that are consistent
with historical changes, it does not suggest that monetary policy
had much to do with the reduction in inﬂation volatility. Looking
across tables 9 and 10, changes in policy lead to reductions of the
standard deviation of inﬂation of at most 10 percent, well short of
the historical reductions.
The ﬁnal column of table 10 adds the assumption of a ﬁxed inﬂa-
tion target. As might be expected, the persistence of inﬂation drops
further, as does the slope of the simple Phillips curve. The standard
deviation of inﬂation also drops and is now in the historical range.
However, this reduction in inﬂation volatility occurs only when the
persistence of inﬂation is considerably lower than was the case for
the 1983–2002 period.
Vol. 2 No. 3 Monetary Policy and Inﬂation Dynamics 225
7. How Might the Economy Behave under a Fixed
Inﬂation Target?
As ﬁgure 2 suggested, the evidence for a drop in inﬂation persis-
tence is, thus far, inconclusive. However, estimates limited to the
past decade are suggestive that inﬂation may have become more sta-
ble. In this section, I use the three-equation model to consider how
the behavior of the economy may change in a regime of inﬂation
stability.
Expectations formation is central to the question of how inﬂa-
tion dynamics are likely to change in a regime of inﬂation stability.
In the simulations considered so far, equation (9) has been used as
the model of expectations formation. In equation (9), “nonoptimiz-
ing” agents rely on past inﬂation as an indicator of future inﬂation.
Similarly, under CEE’s interpretation of the model, agents ﬁnd it
useful to use lagged inﬂation to index prices in periods when they
do not reoptimize. It is most useful to use lagged inﬂation as a predic-
tor of future inﬂation when inﬂation is highly persistent; if inﬂation
were not persistent, lagged inﬂation would not be a good indicator of
future inﬂation. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that if inﬂation
were to be stabilized, agents would change their inﬂation forecast-
ing rules. Here, I consider one characterization of how agents might
change the way they set expectations as inﬂation dynamics change.
In particular, I consider the following generalization of equation (9):
Et ∆pt+1 = ωMt ∆pt+1 + (1 − ω)λ∆pt−1, (14)
where the parameter λ is chosen so as to give the best “univariate”
forecast of inﬂation. (For simplicity, the implicit inﬂation target is
assumed to be zero.) Thus, in equation (9), λ = 1 was the best uni-
variate forecast under the assumption—which has heretofore been
close to accurate—that inﬂation had a unit root.
Suppose that the central bank adopts a ﬁxed inﬂation target.
According to column 4 of table 7, in the three-equation model with
λ = 1, this change would result in an inﬂation process with a root
of 0.92. We can then ask what would happen if agents adopted a
univariate inﬂation forecast with λ = 0.92. A simulation under this
assumption shows that inﬂation will have a root of 0.79. But then,
agents will want to update their forecasting rule to be consistent with
this new assessment of the serial correlation of inﬂation. Doing so,
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however, further reduces the persistence of inﬂation. Following this
process to its logical conclusion suggests that a “ﬁxed point” for uni-
variate expectations formation is approximately zero autocorrelation
(actually, the ﬁxed point is λ = 0.02).
According to this model, then, the long-run consequences of a
policy of a ﬁxed inﬂation target is inﬂation that is not only station-
ary but actually uncorrelated. Of course, this evolution is based on
a particular assumption about expectations formation. But there is
some historical precedent for such an outcome. Ball (2000) argues
that in the 1879–1914 period, when the United States was on the
gold standard, the “best univariate forecast” for inﬂation was zero:
under the gold standard, inﬂation was not expected to persist. Ball
(2000) and Gordon (1980) argue that allowing perceived inﬂation
dynamics to change with the policy regime can go a long way to
allowing the expectations-augmented Phillips curve—which works
well in the second half of the twentieth century—to account for the
properties of inﬂation under the gold standard.
If a central bank were to adopt a ﬁxed inﬂation target, how
quickly might a transition to stable inﬂation take place? Based on
simulations with the baseline three-equation model, it could take a
while for agents to catch on. In table 7, for example, inﬂation is
predicted to have an autoregressive root of 0.92 even under a ﬁxed
inﬂation target. In the twenty-year sample underlying these simula-
tions, the t-ratio of the hypothesis that this coeﬃcient is still one is
only 1.6, well short of Dickey-Fuller critical values. So even if agents
with univariate expectations were good time-series econometricians,
they may see little need to change the way they form their expec-
tations. FRB/US, however, is more sanguine: switching to a ﬁxed
inﬂation target leads to a large reduction in the persistence of inﬂa-
tion, and the largest root of inﬂation falls to 0.77 (table 9, column 4,
and table 10, column 5). If this were the case, the transition to stable
inﬂation could occur more rapidly.
8. Conclusions
Can the changes in monetary policy that took place in the United
States in the years after 1979 account for the subsequent changes
in inﬂation dynamics? Overall, the evidence presented here suggests
that the answer is yes: the monetary policy changes I consider predict
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large declines in the slope of the reduced-form relationship between
the change in inﬂation and the unemployment rate, holding ﬁxed
the structural parameters underlying inﬂation behavior. This result
holds both in the large-scale FRB/US model and in a small New
Keynesian-style model.
These changes in policy also have implications for the volatility
of output and inﬂation—which also changed in the early 1980s. The
results for inﬂation volatility were mixed: in the small model, changes
in monetary policy can account for most or all of the reduction in
the standard deviation of inﬂation. By contrast, in FRB/US, these
monetary policy changes predict only a small reduction in inﬂation
volatility.
The paper considered two alternative views of the change in
monetary policy. One view is that the responsiveness of monetary
policy to output and inﬂation increased, along the lines suggested
by Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000). I also considered the implica-
tions of an alternative view of the change in the monetary policy
process suggested by Orphanides et al. (2000)—that policymakers
may have improved their methods for estimating potential GDP.
This alternative view strengthens the ability of monetary policy
changes to explain changes in the economy, implying greater reduc-
tions in volatility and in the slope of the reduced-form Phillips
curve.
As in other recent work, I ﬁnd that changes in monetary pol-
icy can explain only a small fraction of the reduction in the stan-
dard deviation of the growth rate of output. However, I ﬁnd that
changes in monetary policy can explain most or all of the reduction
in the standard deviation of the output gap; such eﬀects are espe-
cially strong in the FRB/US model. There are a number of possible
explanations for this result. One possibility is that improvements in
monetary policy can account for a large proportion of the reduc-
tion in aggregate demand volatility—and thus can account for the
reduction in the volatility of the output gap, which abstracts from
shocks to aggregate supply. As suggested by McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (2000), another possibility is that improvements in inventory
management are also an important source of the reduction in out-
put volatility. Because inventory investment is not very persistent,
improvements in inventory management would have a dispropor-
tionate eﬀect on output growth relative to the output gap. Sorting
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through these possibilities would be an interesting topic for future
research.
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